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COORDINATING SERVICE COMPOSITION
The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks implies
new economic and organizational challenges. As coordination mechanisms, auctions have proven to
perform quite well in situations where intangible and heterogeneous goods are traded. Nevertheless
traditional approaches in the area of multiattribute combinatorial auctions are not quite suitable to
enable the trade of composite services. A flawless service execution and therefore the requester's
valuation highly depends on the accurate sequence of the functional parts of the composition, meaning
that in contrary to service bundles, composite services only generate value through a valid order of
their components. We present an abstract model as a formalization of a service value network. The
model comprehends a graph-based mechanism design to allocate multiattribute service offers within
the network, to impose penalties for non-performance and to determine prices for complex services.
The mechanism and the bidding language support various types of QoS attributes and their (semantic)
aggregation. We analytically show that this variant is incentive compatible with respect to all
dimensions of the service offer (quality and price).
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Coordination, Service Value Network, Pricing Model, Semantics.
The research was funded by means of the German Federal Ministry of Economy and Technology
under the promotional reference “01MQ07012”.
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INTRODUCTION

The paradigm shift from a product- to a service-oriented economy fosters the movement of complete
industries from vertical integration to horizontal specialization. Hierarchically organized firms start to
cooperate in firmly-coupled strategic networks with stable inter-organizational ties, recently exploring
the benefits of moving to more loosely-coupled configurations of legally independent firms. In theory,
complex products or services can be produced by a single vertically integrated company. But in this
case the company is not able to focus on its core competencies, having to cover the whole spectrum of
the value chain. Also, it has to burden all risks in a complex, changing and uncertain environment by
itself. This is why companies tend to engage in networked value creation which allows participants to
focus on their strengths. At the same time rapid innovation in the ICT sector enables promising
opportunities in B2B communication which also supports the current trend. However, especially in
complex and highly dynamic industries, forming value networks – especially business webs with their
open structure – is more than an attractive strategic alternative. Prominent advocates of this new
paradigm are (Tapscott et al., 2000, Hagel III, 1996, Zerdick et al., 2000, Steiner, 2005). As (Tapscott
et al., 2000, Steiner, 2005) express it, business webs bring together mutually networked, permanently
changing legally independent actors in customer centric, mostly heterarchical organizational forms in
order to create (joint) value for customers. Specialized firms co-opetitively contribute modules to an
overall value proposition under the presence of network externalities. A prime example for such
highly dynamic fields of application is the internet of services. We briefly outline the advantages of
business webs related to modularization and specialization (Zerdick et al., 2000): Concentration on
core competencies strengthens specialization (C1); Sharing the risk involved (C2); High level of
flexibility (C3); Modularization brings potential for innovation and allows for rapid market penetration
(C4); Fruitful interplay of competition and partnership (C5).
Auctions have proven to perform well under these conditions to coordinate value generation while
addressing mentioned network characteristics. Nevertheless traditional approaches in the area of
multiattribute combinatorial auctions are not quite suitable to enable the trade of composite services.
Auctions for composite services are much more complex than simple procuring auctions, where the
suppliers themselves offer a full solution to the procurer. In composite services, this is not the case, as
a flawless service execution and therefore the requester's valuation highly depends on the accurate
sequence of its functional parts, meaning that in contrary to service bundles, composite services only
generate value through a valid order of their components.
As a coordination mechanism in networked economies we propose a multidimensional procurement
auction for trading composite services. We present a graph-based model that captures the main
components and characteristics of service value networks. Based on this model we introduced a
mechanism design that enables allocation and pricing of service components that together form a
requested complex service. The mechanism is capable of handling a wide range of aggregation
operations for service attributes also supporting rich semantic approaches for dealing with complex
non-functional service specifications. Due to the combinatorial restrictions imposed by the underlying
graph topology and the absence of capacity constraints, the winner determination problem can be
solved in polynomial time which is a crucial issue when it comes to implementing online systems. We
furthermore show that the proposed mechanism is individual rational, allocation efficient and
incentive compatible with respect to QoS characteristics and prices of service offers. Hence, reporting
the true type regarding configuration and price is a weakly dominant strategy for all service providers.
This paper is structured as follows: The next section gives a brief overview over the literature. Section
3 illustrates the idea of on-demand service procurement in networked economies based on an
integration scenario from SAP BusinessByDesign. In Section 4 we propose a multidimensional
procurement auction for trading composite services based on an abstract model of a service value
network. The mechanism comprehends a multiattribute bidding language (Section 4.1) and the central
allocation function (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 demonstrates the semantic aggregation of service

attributes and the auction conduction by providing a numerical example. An extension regarding
service level guarantees and penalties for non-performance is introduced in Section 4.4. In Section 4.5
we analytically show the providers’ bidding strategies and valuable properties of proposed mechanism
design. Section 5 concludes with a summary, the practical realization of our approach and future work.
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RELATED WORK

Recently, an enormous body of work has been done that investigates problems of coordination from a
game theoretic and computer science perspective (Papadimitriou, 2001). Especially the discipline of
mechanism design that focuses on the problem to coordinate self-interested participants in pursuing an
overall goal (Nisan and Ronen, 2001). The authors design suitable mechanisms to standard
optimization problems in the area of task scheduling and routing. In incentive compatible mechanisms
agents are incentivized to choose the strategy of revealing their true type. Incentive compatible
mechanisms such as the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism are firstly introduced
and extensively investigated by (Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973, Vickrey, 1961). It is important to notice
that incentive compatibility in VCG-based mechanisms may fail in repeated games (Binmore and
Swierzbinski, 2000) due to the possibility to learn from past situations and adjust ones strategy in a
trial-and-error process.
Most of the research has been done with respect to truth-telling of one-dimensional types. The field of
designing incentive compatible mechanisms, that induce truth-telling of multidimensional properties
of goods or services, still lacks deeper research. A thorough analysis and investigation in the area of
multidimensional auctions and the design of optimal scoring rules has been done in (Branco, 1997,
Che et al., 1993). In (Bichler and Kalagnanam, 2005) the winner determination problem in
configurable multiattribute auctions is investigated from an operational research perspective without
accounting for mechanism design aspects such as incentive compatibility. In (Parkes and Kalagnanam,
2002, Parkes and Kalagnanam, 2005) the authors introduce iterative multiattribute procurement
auctions focusing on mechanism design issues and solving the multiattribute allocation problem.
Preferences for multidimensional goods and multidimensional types in scoring auctions are
extensively investigated in (Asker and Cantillon, 2008) and extended to combinatorial auctions in
(Müller et al., 2008). Nevertheless their work does not consider value chains and sequences of services
as well as their technically feasible interrelations in order to coordinate value generation in service
networks. All of these approaches assume bundles of goods in scenarios where the sequence and order
does not matter and therefore cannot be applied to composite services that only fulfil their objectives
in the right sequence of execution.
Nevertheless, combinatorial auctions yield major drawbacks regarding computational feasibility that
result from an NP-hard complexity. Computational feasibility implies a trade-off between optimality
and valuable mechanism properties such as incentive compatibility. Several authors propose
approximate solutions for incentive compatible mechanisms to overcome issues of computational
complexity (Nisan and Ronen, 2007, Ronen, 2001, Ronen and Lehmann, 2005). Path auctions as a
subset of combinatorial auctions reduce complexity through predefining all feasible service
combinations in an underlying graph topology and are investigated in (Archer and Tardos, 2007,
Feigenbaum et al., 2006, Hershberger and Suri, 2001). In their work, path auctions are utilized for
pricing and routing in networks of resources such as computation or electricity. Application-related
issues of auctions to optimal routing are examined by (Feldman et al., 2005, Maille and Tuffin, 2007).
All of these approaches deal with the utility services layer according to the service classification in
(Blau et al., 2008) and hence do not cover the problems related to complex services.
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BUSINESS SCENARIO

To illustrate the idea of a service value network we introduce a business scenario which is actually
delivered to customers as part of SAP’s BusinessByDesign1. The scenario consists of modular service
components that can be provided by decentralized service providers. The integration scenario “Service
Request and Order Management” (cp Figure 1) describes operational processes in a customer service
based on service requests, service orders and service confirmations. From an end-to-end perspective
the scenario includes the integration into related applications such as logistics planning and execution,
invoicing and payment, as well as financial accounting.

Figure 1 Business Process "Service Request and Order Management"
A service value network is formed by many decentralized service providers that contribute to the
achievement of an overall goal. In our scenario this goal is the flawless execution of a business
scenario in order to provide defined functionality to the customer. From now on we call this overall
goal a complex service. Recalling the main characteristics of service value networks there are many
service providers that offer differentiated and specialized services covering various types of
functionality within the network. In our scenario the functionality of each component can be
modularized and therefore performed by different software-as-a-service providers as depicted in Table
1. The rapid upcoming of on-demand service providers shows the high degree of innovation and
market penetration as a result of modularization (C4). Service providers offer specialized services and
concentrate on their core competencies (C1). Each service provider is responsible for a certain part of
the overall functionality which consequently spreads the risk of an erroneous business process over all
contributing service providers (C2). Furthermore they partly grant access to their own resource
supporting the realization of the overall business scenario (C5). The potential of substituting service
providers on demand enables flexibility and rapid reaction on changing market requirements (C3).
CRM
Salesforce

SCM
GXS

FIN
Cashview

(http://www.salesforce.com/)

(http://www.gxs.com/)

(http://www.cashview.com/)

Rightnow

7Hills

Opsource

(http://www.rightnow.com/)

(http://www.7hillsbiz.com/)

(http://www.opsource.net/)

Oracle

Intacct

(http://www.oracle.com/crmondemand/)

(http://www.intact.com/)

SAP
(http://www.sap.com/solutions/sme/businessbydesign/)

Table 1. SaaS Providers for CRM, SCM and FIN Components and their Functional Coverage

1

http://www.sap.com/solutions/sme/businessbydesign/
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ABSTRACT MODEL & MECHANISM DESIGN

A service value network is represented by an k -partite, directed and acyclic graph G = (V , E ) . Each
partition y1 ,… , yK of the graph represents a functionality cluster that entails services that provide the
same functionality (substitutes). The set of N nodes V = {v1 ,… , vN } represents the set of service offers
with v is an arbitrary service offer. Services are offered by a set of Q Service Providers S = {s1 ,… , sQ }
with s is an arbitrary service provider. The ownership information σ : S → V that reveals which
service provider owns which service within the network is public knowledge. There are two
designated nodes vs and v f standing for source and sink in the network. The set of M edges
E = {e1 ,… , eM } denotes service compatibilities and interoperabilities such that eij represents
interoperability of service j with service i and their sequence of execution. A service configuration
Aj of service j is fully characterized by a set of attributes Aj = {a1j ,… , a Lj } where a lj is an attribute
value of attribute type l of service j 's configuration. Let furthermore cij (eij , Aj ) denote a cost function
that maps service j 's configuration to corresponding costs such that c : E × A → R . cij denotes costs
that the service provider who owns service j has to bear for developing a service that is interoperable
with service i (development and production costs) and for performing it during execution (execution
costs). Configuration and costs are private knowledge to the service provider who owns a particular
service (type). If two services are not interoperable at all, they are not connected within the network.
Value is created through the network by performing a sequence of services that form a connected path
from source to sink. We call such created value a complex service. Let F denote the set of all feasible
paths from source to sink. Every f ∈ F represents a possible instantiation of the complex service. F−i
represents the set of all feasible paths from source to sink without node i and its incoming and
outgoing edges. Let Fi be the set of all feasible paths from source to sink that entail node i . In our
model we focus on the core process of realizing an overall goal without going into process-related
details such as parallel or cyclic components. We apply a business and management-oriented view
addressing the question of how an overall goal can be achieved maximizing the systems welfare and to
dynamically determine prices.
4.1

Bidding Language

As a formalization of information objects which are exchanged during auction conduction we
introduce a bidding language based on bidding languages for products with multiple attributes as
discussed in (Engel et al., 2006). Our formalization is aligned to multiattribute auction theory as
presented in (Parkes and Kalagnanam, 2002, Ronen and Lehmann, 2005) and assures compliance with
the WS-Agreement specification in order to enable realization in decentralized environments such as
the Web.
A service requester wants to purchase a complex service f which is characterized by a configuration
A f . The importance of certain attributes and prices of a requested complex service is idiosyncratic and
depends on the preferences of the requester. The requester's preferences are represented by a utility
function U of the form:
(1)

U f (α , Λ, A , P ) = α S ( A f ) − T f

T f denotes the sum of all transfer payments the requester has to transact to service providers that

contribute to the complex service such that T f =

∑t

eij ∈ f

j

. The configuration A f of the complex service

is the aggregation of all attribute values of contributing services on the path f

such that

A f = (A1f ,… , A fL ) with A fl = ⊕eij ∈ f a lj . The aggregation of attributes values depends on their type (i.e.

encryption can be aggregated by an AND operator whereas response time is aggregated by a sum
operator). Different methods for aggregating service attributes are presented in Section 4.3.
⎛

⎞

The scoring rule S ( A f ) = ⎜ ∑ λl A f l ⎟ represents the requester’s valuation for a configuration A f of
L

⎝ l =1

⎠

the complex service represented by path f . The scoring rule is specified by a set of weights
Λ = {λ1 ,… , λL } with

∑

L
l =1

λl = 1 that defines the requester’s preferences of each attribute type analog to

the definition of scoring rules in (Asker and Cantillon, 2008). To assure comparability of attribute
values from different attribute types the aggregated attribute values A f l are mapped on an interval
[0;1] . T f represents the overall price of the complex service. α can be interpreted as the willingness
to pay for a optimal configuration S ( A f ) = 1 based on the requester’s score. In other words α defines
the substitution rate between configuration and price based on the requester’s preferences.
Definition 1.

Multiattribute Service Request

A request for a complex service is a vector of the form
(2)

R := (G, F , α , Λ, Γ)

with G represents a complex service network, F represents all feasible paths from source to
sink that form a possible instantiation of a complex service, Λ the requester’s preferences and
α the willingness to pay. Γ denotes the set of lower and upper boundaries for each attribute
type.
A service offer consists of an announced service configuration Aj and a corresponding price bid pij
that a service provider wants to charge for service j being invoked depending on the predecessor
service i such that bij (eij ) = ( Aj , pij ) is a service offer bid for invocation of service j which
interoperable with a predecessor service i with b : E → A × R . A service provider s bids for all
incoming edges to every service it owns.
Definition 2.

Multiattribute Service Offer

A multiattribute service offer is a bid matrix of the form

(3)

⎧b (e ) = ( Aj , pij ), i ∈ τ ( j ), j ∈ σ ( s)
B s := ⎨ ij ij
otherwise
⎩0,

with τ (v) denotes the set of all predecessor services to service v with τ :V → V and σ ( s) the
set of all services owned by service provider s .
4.2

Mechanism Design

The mechanism maximizes welfare by allocating a path f * within the service value network that

yields the highest overall utility. Let U f denote welfare induced by path f with U f = α S ( A f ) − Pf .
(4)

o := argmax f ∈F U f

Let U * denote the utility of the winning path meaning the utility of a path f * that maximizes welfare.
Let U−*s denote the utility of a path f −*s that yields a maximum overall utility in the reduced graph
without every service owned by service provider s and its incoming and outgoing edges.

Every service provider s receives a payment or transfer t s = ∑ i∈τ ( j ), j∈σ ( s ),e ∈ f t sj for all services it owns
*

ij

s
j

which are on the winning path. A payment t for service j corresponds to the monetary equivalent of
the utility gap between the “winning path” and “second best path”. In other words a monetary
equivalent to the utility service j contributes to the systems welfare. This monetary equivalent
represents the price that service provider s could have charged without losing her participation in the
winning allocation.
(5)

t sj := pij + ( U * − U−*s )

Consequently the payment function t s for service provider s is defined as
(6)

⎧ ∑ ∑ pij + ( U * − U−*s ), if eij ∈ o
⎪
t s := ⎨ j∈σ ( s ) i∈τ ( j )
⎪⎩0,
otherwise

Costs c s that service provider s has to bear for performing offered and allocated services result
accordingly:
(7)

⎧ ∑ ∑ cij (eij , Aj ), if eij ∈ o
⎪
c s := ⎨ j∈σ ( s ) i∈τ ( j )
⎪⎩0,
otherwise

The solution to the allocation problem in (4) can be computed in polynomial time using well-known
graph algorithms to determine the ''shortest'' within a network such as the Dijkstra algorithm. Using a
Fibonacci heap data structure the time complexity can be reduced to O(n log(n) + m) with m is the
number of edges and n the number of nodes within the graph. According to the payment scheme in
(6) the allocation must be computed twice: Based on the graph with the service offerings of the service
provider receiving the payment and without its participation. In the second case the graph can be preprocessed and reduced by all service offerings owned by the service provider that receives the
payment. After the reduction the shortest path can be computed accordingly which yields the same
time complexity. In contrary to the NP-hard complexity in general combinatorial auctions this is a
valuable achievement that enables the conduction of our auction in online systems.
4.3

Aggregation and Preference Mapping of Service Attributes

In order to determine the overall score for a provider based on its scoring function, the attribute values
of the complex service have to be computed. Recall, the type of function for aggregating attribute
value highly depends on the attribute type. Traditional quality of service attributes such as response
time for example can be aggregated with basic mathematic operations such a sum operator. Table 2
shows different types of aggregation functions for multiple attribute types exemplarily. For example,
the overall throughput of a complex service that consists of multiple service components is determined
by the lowest throughput rate within the allocation and can therefore be computed using a minimum
operator.
Attribute Type
l

Aggregation
⊕leij ∈ f a lj

Response Time (rt)

∑

Encryption Type (et)

∧e ∈ f a etj

eij ∈ f

a rtj

ij

Error Rate (er)

max eij ∈ f a erj

Throughput (tp)

min eij ∈ f a tjp

Probability of Default (pd)

1 − ∏ e ∈ f (1 − a jpd )
ij

Probability of Success (ps)

∏

eij ∈ f

a jps

Table 2. Aggregation Functions for Different Types of Attributes
Nevertheless, only considering basic quality of service attributes is not sufficient for dealing with
complex non-functional service characteristics that express rich semantic information. The auction
mechanism must be capable of aggregating a broad range of descriptive service attributes that express
multiple quality aspects. The following example depicted in Figure 2 shows a service value network
with four service offers and three possible paths from source to sink ( f top , f middle , f bottom ).
p s 1 = 13

1
a1ie = DES128

p12 = 16

a1ps = 0.9

2
a2ie = RSA128
a2ps = 0.7

p14 = 17

s

f

p s 3 = 10

3

4

a3ie = CFB128

a4ie = RSA256

a3ps = 0.9

p34 = 20

a4ps = 0.8

Figure 2 Numerical Example
For simplicity and without loss of generality we assume that each service provider owns only a single
service. Price values on the edges represent price bids announced by service providers. Each service
configuration consists of attribute values for the types encryption ( a ie ) and probability of success
( a ps ). Attribute values are aggregated according to the aggregation operations in Table 2. Encryption
types are derived from the concepts in the security algorithm ontology as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Security Algorithm Ontology

The service requester announces its willingness to pay and weights for each attribute type representing
its scoring function such that λie = 0.2 , λ ps = 0.8 and α = 100 . Furthermore it specifies the individual
encryption attribute type in first order logic:
IndividualEncryption( x) ← (BlockCipher( x) ∧ hasKeyLength( x, k )
∧isGreaterOrEqual(k , '128 ')) ∨ (AsymmetricAlgorithm( x )
∧ hasKeyLength( x, k ) ∧ isGreaterOrEqual( k , ' 256 '))

The mechanism allocates service offers on a path from source to sink based on the service request and
announced multiattribute offers according to (4). The welfare level, generated by each allocation
evolves as follows:
U ftop = 100(0.2(1 ∧ 0) + 0.8(0.9 × 0.7)) − (13 + 16) = 21.4
U fmiddle = 100(0.2(1 ∧ 1) + 0.8(0.9 × 0.8)) − (13 + 17) = 47.6
U fbottom = 100(0.2(0 ∧ 1) + 0.8(0.9 × 0.8)) − (10 + 20) = 27.6

Therefore f middle is allocated as it yields the highest welfare and each service provider that owns a
service on it receives a payment according to (6) such that t1 = 13 + (47.6 − 27.6) = 33 and
t 4 = 17 + (47.6 − 21.4) = 43.2 . The transfer is designed to compensate service providers for their
contribution to the system’s welfare which implies that i.e. provider 1 could have bid a price of 33
without having lost its participation in the allocation.
4.4

Verification of Service-Level-Agreements

As introduced in Section 4.1 service providers’ bids contain a configuration and a price component.
The allocation function maximizes welfare based on the achieved quality for the service requester and
the costs that occur on the producer’s side. This shows that the announced quality also determines the
likelihood of being allocated which might induce and incentive for service providers to lie about their
configuration. Therefore proposed mechanism is extended with a so called ex-post verification term
which is explained in detail in this section.
Let a lj be the announced attribute value of attribute type l of service j 's configuration. Furthermore
let a lj be the actual attribute value of attribute type l realized ex-post by service j during execution.
U *j is the overall winning path utility with the actual realized attribute values a1j , …, a lj of service j .

Auctioning services based on a platform approach opens up the possibility of ex-post verification. This
means that the actual delivered quality of participating services can be measured and monitored after
execution. Therefore we can ex-ante enforce a true announcement of quality to be delivered by
verifying it ex-post. According to the Compensation-and-Bonus Mechanism introduced in (Nisan and
Ronen, 2001) a compensation function is constructed as follows
(8)

*
*
⎪⎧( U − U j ), if eij ∈ o
Δt j := ⎨
otherwise
⎪⎩0,

The compensation function represents the utility gap that results from the utility difference of the
announced attribute values and the actual performed ones from the service requester's perspective. In
other words the gap that results from the utility loss the systems incurs because of the service
provider's untruthful announcement. The monetary equivalent to this utility gap according to the
requester’s preferences represents the penalty payment the service provider has to bear for deviating
from the announced attribute values. This negative consequence can be interpreted as a contractual
penalty for not realizing specified service-level-agreements as defined in (Salle and Bartolini, 2004).
Taking the compensation function into account the payment function is extended as follows:

⎧ ∑ ∑ bij (eij ) + ( U * − U−*s ) − Δt j , if eij ∈ o
⎪
t := ⎨ j∈σ ( s ) i∈τ ( j )
⎪⎩0,
otherwise
s

(9)

4.5

An Analytical Analysis of Bidding Strategies of Service Providers

The bidding strategy of each service provider comprehends a price announcement and a corresponding
service configuration consisting of a set of attribute values as introduced in the Section 4.1. In this
section we analytically analyze providers’ bidding strategies in proposed mechanism design:
Lemma 1. In a Multiattribute Verification Mechanism for each service provider s ∈ S the
reward is independent from its bids consisting of the announced attribute values a1s ,…, asL and
the announced prices pij ∀i ∈ τ ( j ), ∀j ∈ σ ( s) .
Proof of Lemma 1. Assuming without loss of generality that service provider s only owns one service
z with a configuration Az . F− z denotes the set of all feasible paths from source to sink without service
z and its incoming and outgoing edges. We denote f * as the path which is allocated by o . Let Uz* be
the utility of path f * in the graph with service z . Let U−*z be the utility of path f −*z in the reduced
graph without service z and its incoming and outgoing edges. Let U * (eiz ) denote the utility of path
f * with eiz ∈ f * .
U z* is the overall winning path utility with the actual realized attribute values a1z , …, azl of service z .

An invocation eij of service z is allocated by o iff U * (eiz ) ≥ U−*z . In this case the profit of service
provider s evolves as follows:
π s = piz + t s − c s
π s = piz + ( U * − U−*s ) − Δt z − ciz (eiz , Az )

(

)

π s = piz + ( U * − U−*s ) − ( U * − U z* ) − ciz (eiz , Az )

(

)

π s = piz + U z* − U−*s − ciz (eiz , Az )

(10)

⎛ ⎛

L

⎞

π s = ⎜ α ⎜ ∑ λl Azl ⎟ −
⎜
⎝ ⎝ l =1

⎠

∑

eij ∈ f * |eij ≠ eiz

⎞
pij − U−*s ⎟ − ciz (eiz , Az )
⎟
⎠

Azl denotes the aggregated and normalized attribute values of type l with the ex-post realized attribute

values from service z . Equation (10) shows that once a service z is allocated, its reward is
independent from its announced price piz and all announced attribute values a1z ,…, azL . In other words
s 's bid does not have an impact on the transfer function t s .
Theorem 1. In a Multiattribute Verification Mechanism, for each service provider s ∈ S the
bidding strategy bij (eij ) = ( Aj , pij ) with a lj = a lj ∀l ∈ L, pij = cij (eij , Aj ) (truth telling with respect
to configuration and price) ∀i ∈ τ ( j ), ∀j ∈ σ ( s) is a weakly dominant strategy.
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 1 shows that once service providers are allocated they are not able to
influence their reward as π is independent from the announced attribute values and prices.
Nevertheless, bids have an impact on the chance of being allocated. Assuming without loss of
generality that service provider s only owns one service z with a configuration Az . A service
provider s wants to be allocated iff π s > 0 .

U * (eiz ) > U−*z ⇔ π s > 0

(

)

U * (eiz ) > U−*z ⇔ piz + U z* − U−*z − ciz (eiz , Az ) > 0

(11)

U * (eiz ) > U−*z ⇔ piz + U z* > ciz (eiz , Az ) + U−*z

A possible solution that satisfies (11) is truth-telling with respect to configuration and price such that
piz = ciz (eiz , Az ) and U * (eiz ) = U z* . As shown in Lemma 1 service providers have no control about their
reward once they are allocated which implies that any other possible solution besides truth-telling that
satisfies (11) is not better than truth-telling. Hence, reporting attribute values a1z ,…, azl truthfully
meaning that announced values are actually realized through execution such that azl = azl ∀l ∈ L and
consequently U * (eiz ) = U z* as well as piz = ciz (eiz , Az ) is a weakly dominant strategy.
Theorem 1 shows that the provider’s bidding strategy is determined through the mechanism design.
Service providers act best (or at least as good as any other alternative) by reporting their services’
configurations and internal costs truthfully which is a valuable mechanism property from a requester’s
perspective. This property assures that although all service providers act self-interested and therefore
try to maximize their profit, their dominant strategy maximizes the system’s welfare and the requester
receives a technical feasible instantiation of the desired complex service at a guaranteed service level.
This is a valuable property as it tremendously lowers strategic complexity for service providers and
fosters a trustful requester-provider-relationship. It is well-known in literature that incentive
compatibility in VCG-based mechanisms may fail in repeated games (Binmore and Swierzbinski,
2000). Nevertheless, in service value networks we observe a high degree of dynamicity with respect to
changing service providers, variable costs and network topologies. Thus, each auction setting is
different from the preceding one which makes learning from past situations impossible and each game
can therefore be treated as a one-shot game.
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CONCLUSION

We proposed a multidimensional procurement auction for trading composite services in networked
economies. We presented a graph-based model that captures the main components and characteristics
of service value networks. Based on this model we introduced a mechanism design that enables
allocation and pricing of service components that together form a requested complex service.
However, auctions for composite services are much more complex than simple procuring auctions,
where the suppliers themselves offer a full solution to the procurer. In composite services, this is not
the case, as a flawless service execution and therefore the requester's valuation highly depends on the
accurate sequence of its functional parts, meaning that in contrary to service bundles, composite
services only generate value through a valid order of their components. The allocation is computed
based on the requester's score for QoS characteristics of the complex service. At the same time, the
mechanism is capable of handling a wide range of aggregation operations for service attributes also
supporting rich semantic approaches for dealing with complex non-functional service specifications.
Due to the combinatorial restrictions imposed by the underlying graph topology and the absence of
capacity constraints, the winner determination problem can be solved in polynomial time which is a
crucial issue when it comes to implementing online systems. We furthermore showed that proposed
mechanism is individual rational, allocation efficient and incentive compatible with respect to QoS
characteristics and prices of service offers. Hence, reporting the true type regarding configuration and
price is a weakly dominant strategy for all service providers. This is a valuable property as a it
tremendously lowers strategic complexity for service providers and fosters a trustful requesterprovider-relationship.

Proposed graph-based scoring auction is evaluated in the TEXO use case of the THESEUS2 project.
TEXO is a research project, within the Theseus research program initiated by the Federal Ministry of
Economy and Technology (BMWi). Within the Theseus program, TEXO contributes to service
economy by creating infrastructure components for business webs in the Internet of Services. Via
intuitive interfaces and technical systems TEXO addresses the full lifecycle of these services from
innovation to productive usage. Addressing these demands requires an interdisciplinary approach to
create an integrated platform for the internet of services which supports all phases of the lifecycle. For
all stakeholders and participants in such a service value network, innovative business models being as
flexible as the network itself are required. Especially the novel requirements for pricing models are
addressed by proposed graph-based multidimensional procurement auction. The auction mechanism is
capable of allocating and pricing of composite services in an efficient and truthful manner. It enables
flexible participation and switching for service providers and at the same time it does not require
complete information about configurations, prices and interrelations from the service requester’s
perspective which makes the mechanism favourable for ad-hoc and situational environments such as
service value networks.
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